In January 2022, KrebsOnSecurity identified a Russian man named Mikhail Matveev as “Wazawaka,” a cybercriminal who was deeply involved in the formation and operation of multiple ransomware groups. The U.S. government indicted Matveev as a top ransomware purveyor a year later, offering $10 million for information leading to his arrest. Last week, the Russian government reportedly arrested Matveev and charged him with creating malware used to extort companies.
Matveev, a.k.a. “Wazawaka” and “Boriselcin” worked with at least three different ransomware gangs that extorted hundreds of millions of dollars from companies, schools, hospitals and government agencies, U.S. prosecutors allege.
Russia’s interior ministry last week issued a statement saying a 32-year-old hacker had been charged with violating domestic laws against the creation and use of malicious software. The announcement didn’t name the accused, but the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti cited anonymous sources saying the man detained is Matveev.
Matveev did not respond to requests for comment. Daryna Antoniuk at TheRecord reports that a security researcher said on Sunday they had contacted Wazawaka, who confirmed being charged and said he’d paid two fines, had his cryptocurrency confiscated, and is currently out on bail pending trial.
Matveev’s hacker identities were remarkably open and talkative on numerous cybercrime forums. Shortly after being identified as Wazawaka by KrebsOnSecurity in 2022, Matveev published multiple selfie videos on Twitter/X where he acknowledged using the Wazawaka moniker and mentioned several security researchers by name (including this author). More recently, Matveev’s X profile (@ransomboris) posted a picture of a t-shirt that features the U.S. government’s “Wanted” poster for him.
The golden rule of cybercrime in Russia has always been that as long as you never hack, extort or steal from Russian citizens or companies, you have little to fear of arrest. Wazawaka claimed he zealously adhered to this rule as a personal and professional mantra.
“Don’t shit where you live, travel local, and don’t go abroad,” Wazawaka wrote in January 2021 on the Russian-language cybercrime forum Exploit. “Mother Russia will help you. Love your country, and you will always get away with everything.”
Still, Wazawaka may not have always stuck to that rule. At several points throughout his career, Wazawaka claimed he made good money stealing accounts from drug dealers on darknet narcotics bazaars.
Cyber intelligence firm Intel 471 said Matveev’s arrest raises more questions than answers, and that Russia’s motivation here likely goes beyond what’s happening on the surface.
“It’s possible this is a shakedown by Kaliningrad authorities of a local internet thug who has tens of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency,” Intel 471 wrote in an analysis published Dec. 2. “The country’s ingrained, institutional corruption dictates that if dues aren’t paid, trouble will come knocking. But it’s usually a problem money can fix.
Intel 471 says while Russia’s court system is opaque, Matveev will likely be open about the proceedings, particularly if he pays a toll and is granted passage to continue his destructive actions.
“Unfortunately, none of this would mark meaningful progress against ransomware,” they concluded.
Although Russia traditionally hasn’t put a lot of effort into going after cybercriminals within its borders, it has brought a series of charges against alleged ransomware actors this year. In January, four men tied to the REvil ransomware group were sentenced to lengthy prison terms. The men were among 14 suspected REvil members rounded up by Russia in the weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.
Earlier this year, Russian authorities arrested at least two men for allegedly operating the short-lived Sugarlocker ransomware program in 2021. Aleksandr Ermakov and Mikhail Shefel (now legally Mikhail Lenin) ran a security consulting business called Shtazi-IT. Shortly before his arrest, Ermakov became the first ever cybercriminal sanctioned by Australia, which alleged he stole and leaked data on nearly 10 million customers of the Australian health giant Medibank.
In December 2023, KrebsOnSecurity identified Lenin as “Rescator,” the nickname used by the cybercriminal responsible for selling more than 100 million payment cards stolen from customers of Target and Home Depot in 2013 and 2014. Last month, Shefel admitted in an interview with KrebsOnSecurity that he was Rescator, and claimed his arrest in the Sugarlocker case was payback for reporting the son of his former boss to the police.
Ermakov was sentenced to two years probation. But on the same day my interview with Lenin was published here, a Moscow court declared him insane, and ordered him to undergo compulsory medical treatment, The Record’s Antoniuk notes.
Steve Gibson and Leo Laporte discuss Microsoft's clarification about AI training data usage, a fascinating breakthrough in understanding autonomous vehicle vulnerabilities, and an urgent call for help from the Tor Network. The show culminates in an in-depth exploration of NASA's incredible Voyager 1 mission, which continues to communicate with Earth from nearly a light-day away despite increasing technical challenges.
• Microsoft clarifies they are NOT using customer data from Office apps to train AI models
• "Digital epileptic seizures" caused by flashing emergency vehicle lights can confuse automated driving systems, posing crash risks
• Tor Network issues urgent call for volunteers to run new WebTunnel bridges to circumvent censorship in Russia
• Zello asks its 140 million users to change passwords as a precautionary measure, hinting at a possible data breach
• FTC opens broad antitrust investigation into Microsoft's business practices across software, cloud, cybersecurity, and AI
• New Android scareware tactic simulates a seriously cracked and malfunctioning smartphone screen
• Steve argues it's likely safe to leave Wireguard VPN ports open, but he prefers not to out of an abundance of caution
• Research shows AI training on AI-generated content can lead to homogeneity and loss of diversity in outputs
• Australia passes world-first law banning children under 16 from social media, with hefty fines for non-compliant platforms
• NASA's Voyager 1 probe, nearly a light-day from Earth, resumes operations after a communications scare but faces mounting technical challenges as it nears the end of its life
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Hosts: Steve Gibson and Leo Laporte
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Phishing attacks increased nearly 40 percent in the year ending August 2024, with much of that growth concentrated at a small number of new generic top-level domains (gTLDs) — such as .shop, .top, .xyz — that attract scammers with rock-bottom prices and no meaningful registration requirements, new research finds. Meanwhile, the nonprofit entity that oversees the domain name industry is moving forward with plans to introduce a slew of new gTLDs.
A study on phishing data released by Interisle Consulting finds that new gTLDs introduced in the last few years command just 11 percent of the market for new domains, but accounted for roughly 37 percent of cybercrime domains reported between September 2023 and August 2024.
Interisle sources data about cybercrime domains from anti-spam organizations, including the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), the Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (CAUCE), and the Messaging, Malware, and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG).
The study finds that while .com and .net domains made up approximately half of all domains registered in the past year (more than all of the other TLDs combined) they accounted for just over 40 percent of all cybercrime domains. Interisle says an almost equal share — 37 percent — of cybercrime domains were registered through new gTLDs.
Spammers and scammers gravitate toward domains in the new gTLDs because these registrars tend to offer cheap or free registration with little to no account or identity verification requirements. For example, among the gTLDs with the highest cybercrime domain scores in this year’s study, nine offered registration fees for less than $1, and nearly two dozen offered fees of less than $2.00. By comparison, the cheapest price identified for a .com domain was $5.91.
Currently, there are around 2,500 registrars authorized to sell domains by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the California nonprofit that oversees the domain industry.
Incredibly, despite years of these reports showing phishers heavily abusing new gTLDs, ICANN is shuffling forward on a plan to introduce even more of them. ICANN’s proposed next round envisions accepting applications for new gTLDs in 2026.
John Levine is author of the book “The Internet for Dummies” and president of CAUCE. Levine said adding more TLDs without a much stricter registration policy will likely further expand an already plentiful greenfield for cybercriminals.
“The problem is that ICANN can’t make up their mind whether they are the neutral nonprofit regulator or just the domain speculator trade association,” Levine told KrebsOnSecurity. “But they act a lot more like the latter.”
Levine said the vast majority of new gTLDs have a few thousand domains — a far cry from the number of registrations they would need just to cover the up-front costs of operating a new gTLD (~$180,000-$300,000). New gTLD registrars can quickly attract customers by selling domains cheaply to customers who buy domains in bulk, but that tends to be a losing strategy.
“Selling to criminals and spammers turns out to be lousy business,” Levine said. “You can charge whatever you want on the first year, but you have to charge list price on domain renewals. And criminals and spammers never renew. So if it sounds like the economics makes no sense it’s because the economics makes no sense.”
In virtually all previous spam reports, Interisle found the top brands referenced in phishing attacks were the largest technology companies, including Apple, Facebook, Google and PayPal. But this past year, Interisle found the U.S. Postal Service was by far the most-phished entity, with more than four times the number of phishing domains as the second most-frequent target (Apple).
At least some of that increase is likely from a prolific cybercriminal using the nickname Chenlun, who has been selling phishing kits targeting domestic postal services in the United States and at least a dozen other countries.
Interisle says an increasing number of phishers are eschewing domain registrations altogether, and instead taking advantage of subdomain providers like blogspot.com, pages.dev, and weebly.com. The report notes that cyberattacks hosted at subdomain provider services can be tough to mitigate, because only the subdomain provider can disable malicious accounts or take down malicious web pages.
“Any action upstream, such as blocking the second-level domain, would have an impact across the provider’s whole customer base,” the report observes.
Interisle tracked more than 1.18 million instances of subdomains used for phishing in the past year (a 114 percent increase), and found more than half of those were subdomains at blogspot.com and other services operated by Google.
“Many of these services allow the creation of large numbers of accounts at one time, which is highly exploited by criminals,” the report concludes. “Subdomain providers should limit the number of subdomains (user accounts) a customer can create at one time and suspend automated, high-volume automated account sign-ups – especially using free services.”
In this week's episode of This Week in Tech, Leo Laporte and guests Devindra Hardawar, Doc Rock, and Jennifer Pattison Tuohy discuss a wide range of topics including Australia's ban on social media for under 16s, the latest in smart home technology and Matter protocol, CES 2024 expectations, Black Friday sales records, Elon Musk's legal battles, the FTC's efforts to protect consumers, and the growing threat of infrastructure sabotage. The panel also touches on the lifespan of smart devices, the ownership of social media accounts, and the growth of Bluesky.
Host: Leo Laporte
Guests: Jennifer Pattison Tuohy, Doc Rock, and Devindra Hardawar
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Show Notes - https://www.grc.com/sn/SN-1002-Notes.pdf
Hosts: Steve Gibson and Leo Laporte
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Two men have been arrested for allegedly stealing data from and extorting dozens of companies that used the cloud data storage company Snowflake, but a third suspect — a prolific hacker known as Kiberphant0m — remains at large and continues to publicly extort victims. However, this person’s identity may not remain a secret for long: A careful review of Kiberphant0m’s daily chats across multiple cybercrime personas suggests they are a U.S. Army soldier who is or was recently stationed in South Korea.
Kiberphant0m’s identities on cybercrime forums and on Telegram and Discord chat channels have been selling data stolen from customers of the cloud data storage company Snowflake. At the end of 2023, malicious hackers discovered that many companies had uploaded huge volumes of sensitive customer data to Snowflake accounts that were protected with nothing more than a username and password (no multi-factor authentication required).
After scouring darknet markets for stolen Snowflake account credentials, the hackers began raiding the data storage repositories for some of the world’s largest corporations. Among those was AT&T, which disclosed in July that cybercriminals had stolen personal information, phone and text message records for roughly 110 million people. Wired.com reported in July that AT&T paid a hacker $370,000 to delete stolen phone records.
On October 30, Canadian authorities arrested Alexander Moucka, a.k.a. Connor Riley Moucka of Kitchener, Ontario, on a provisional arrest warrant from the United States, which has since indicted him on 20 criminal counts connected to the Snowflake breaches. Another suspect in the Snowflake hacks, John Erin Binns, is an American who is currently incarcerated in Turkey.
Investigators say Moucka, who went by the handles Judische and Waifu, had tasked Kiberphant0m with selling data stolen from Snowflake customers who refused to pay a ransom to have their information deleted. Immediately after news broke of Moucka’s arrest, Kiberphant0m was clearly furious, and posted on the hacker community BreachForums what they claimed were the AT&T call logs for President-elect Donald J. Trump and for Vice President Kamala Harris.
“In the event you do not reach out to us @ATNT all presidential government call logs will be leaked,” Kiberphant0m threatened, signing his post with multiple “#FREEWAIFU” tags. “You don’t think we don’t have plans in the event of an arrest? Think again.”
On the same day, Kiberphant0m posted what they claimed was the “data schema” from the U.S. National Security Agency.
“This was obtained from the ATNT Snowflake hack which is why ATNT paid an extortion,” Kiberphant0m wrote in a thread on BreachForums. “Why would ATNT pay Waifu for the data when they wouldn’t even pay an extortion for over 20M+ SSNs?”
Also on Nov. 5, Kiberphant0m offered call logs stolen from Verizon’s push-to-talk (PTT) customers — mainly U.S. government agencies and emergency first responders. On Nov. 9, Kiberphant0m posted a sales thread on BreachForums offering a “SIM-swapping” service targeting Verizon PTT customers. In a SIM-swap, fraudsters use credentials that are phished or stolen from mobile phone company employees to divert a target’s phone calls and text messages to a device they control.
MEET ‘BUTTHOLIO’Kiberphant0m joined BreachForums in January 2024, but their public utterances on Discord and Telegram channels date back to at least early 2022. On their first post to BreachForums, Kiberphant0m said they could be reached at the Telegram handle @cyb3rph4nt0m.
A review of @cyb3rph4nt0m shows this user has posted more than 4,200 messages since January 2024. Many of these messages were attempts to recruit people who could be hired to deploy a piece of malware that enslaved host machines in an Internet of Things (IoT) botnet.
On BreachForums, Kiberphant0m has sold the source code to “Shi-Bot,” a custom Linux DDoS botnet based on the Mirai malware. Kiberphant0m had few sales threads on BreachForums prior to the Snowflake attacks becoming public in May, and many of those involved databases stolen from companies in South Korea.
On June 5, 2024, a Telegram user by the name “Buttholio” joined the fraud-focused Telegram channel “Comgirl” and claimed to be Kiberphant0m. Buttholio made the claim after being taunted as a nobody by another denizen of Comgirl, referring to their @cyb3rph4nt0m account on Telegram and the Kiberphant0m user on cybercrime forums.
“Type ‘kiberphant0m’ on google with the quotes,” Buttholio told another user. “I’ll wait. Go ahead. Over 50 articles. 15+ telecoms breached. I got the IMSI number to every single person that’s ever registered in Verizon, Tmobile, ATNT and Verifone.”
On Sept. 17, 2023, Buttholio posted in a Discord chat room dedicated to players of the video game Escape from Tarkov. “Come to Korea, servers there is pretty much no extract camper or cheater,” Buttholio advised.
In another message that same day in the gaming Discord, Buttholio told others they bought the game in the United States, but that they were playing it in Asia.
“USA is where the game was purchased from, server location is actual in game servers u play on. I am a u.s. soldier so i bought it in the states but got on rotation so i have to use asian servers,” they shared.
‘REVERSESHELL’The account @Kiberphant0m was assigned the Telegram ID number 6953392511. A review of this ID at the cyber intelligence platform Flashpoint shows that on January 4, 2024 Kibertphant0m posted to the Telegram channel “Dstat,” which is populated by cybercriminals involved in launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and selling DDoS-for-hire services [Full disclosure: Flashpoint is currently an advertiser on this website].
Immediately after Kiberphant0m logged on to the Dstat channel, another user wrote “hi buttholio,” to which Kiberphant0m replied with an affirmative greeting “wsg,” or “what’s good.” On Nov. 1, Dstat’s website dstat[.]cc was seized as part of “Operation PowerOFF,” an international law enforcement action against DDoS services.
Flashpoint’s data shows that @kiberphant0m told a fellow member of Dstat on April 10, 2024 that their alternate Telegram username was “@reverseshell,” and did the same two weeks later in the Telegram chat The Jacuzzi. The Telegram ID for this account is 5408575119.
Way back on Nov. 15, 2022, @reverseshell told a fellow member of a Telegram channel called Cecilio Chat that they were a soldier in the U.S. Army. This user also shared the following image of someone pictured waist-down in military fatigues, with a camouflaged backpack at their feet:
In September 2022, Reverseshell was embroiled in an argument with another member who had threatened to launch a DDoS attack against Reverseshell’s Internet address. After the promised attack materialized, Reverseshell responded, “Yall just hit military base contracted wifi.”
In a chat from October 2022, Reverseshell was bragging about the speed of the servers they were using, and in reply to another member’s question said that they were accessing the Internet via South Korea Telecom.
Telegram chat logs archived by Flashpoint show that on Aug. 23, 2022, Reverseshell bragged they’d been using automated tools to find valid logins for Internet servers that they resold to others.
“I’ve hit US gov servers with default creds,” Reverseshell wrote, referring to systems with easy-to-guess usernames and/or passwords. “Telecom control servers, machinery shops, Russian ISP servers, etc. I sold a few big companies for like $2-3k a piece. You can sell the access when you get a big SSH into corporation.”
On July 29, 2023, Reverseshell posted a screenshot of a login page for a major U.S. defense contractor, claiming they had an aerospace company’s credentials to sell.
PROMAN AND VARS_SECCFlashpoint finds the Telegram ID 5408575119 has used several aliases since 2022, including Reverseshell and Proman557.
A search on the username Proman557 at the cyber intelligence platform Intel 471 shows that a hacker by the name “Proman554” registered on Hackforums in September 2022, and in messages to other users Proman554 said they can be reached at the Telegram account Buttholio.
Intel 471 also finds the Proman557 moniker is one of many used by a person on the Russian-language hacking forum Exploit in 2022 who sold a variety of Linux-based botnet malware.
Proman557 was eventually banned — allegedly for scamming a fellow member out of $350 — and the Exploit moderator warned forum users that Proman557 had previously registered under several other nicknames, including an account called “Vars_Secc.”
Vars_Secc’s thousands of comments on Telegram over two years show this user divided their time between online gaming, maintaining a DDoS botnet, and promoting the sale or renting of their botnets to other users.
“I use ddos for many things not just to be a skid,” Vars_Secc pronounced. “Why do you think I haven’t sold my net?” They then proceeded to list the most useful qualities of their botnet:
-I use it to hit off servers that ban me or piss me off
-I used to ddos certain games to get my items back since the data reverts to when u joined
-I use it for server side desync RCE vulnerabilities
-I use it to sometimes ransom
-I use it when bored as a source of entertainment
Flashpoint shows that in June 2023, Vars_Secc responded to taunting from a fellow member in the Telegram channel SecHub who had threatened to reveal their personal details to the federal government for a reward.
“Man I’ve been doing this shit for 4 years,” Vars_Secc replied nonchalantly. “I highly doubt the government is going to pay millions of dollars for data on some random dude operating a pointless ddos botnet and finding a few vulnerabilities here and there.”
For several months in 2023, Vars_Secc also was an active member of the Russian-language crime forum XSS, where they sold access to a U.S. government server for $2,000. However, Vars_Secc would be banned from XSS after attempting to sell access to the Russian telecommunications giant Rostelecom. [In this, Vars_Secc violated the Number One Rule for operating on a Russia-based crime forum: Never offer to hack or sell data stolen from Russian entities or citizens].
On June 20, 2023, Vars_Secc posted a sales thread on the cybercrime forum Ramp 2.0 titled, “Selling US Gov Financial Access.”
“Server within the network, possible to pivot,” Vars_Secc’s sparse sales post read. “Has 3-5 subroutes connected to it. Price $1,250. Telegram: Vars_Secc.”
Vars_Secc also used Ramp in June 2023 to sell access to a “Vietnam government Internet Network Information Center.”
“Selling access server allocated within the network,” Vars_Secc wrote. “Has some data on it. $500.”
BUG BOUNTIESThe Vars_Secc identity claimed on Telegram in May 2023 that they made money by submitting reports about software flaws to HackerOne, a company that helps technology firms field reports about security vulnerabilities in their products and services. Specifically, Vars_Secc said they had earned financial rewards or “bug bounties” from reddit.com, the U.S. Department of Defense, and Coinbase, among 30 others.
“I make money off bug bounties, it’s quite simple,” Vars_Secc said when asked what they do for a living. “That’s why I have over 30 bug bounty reports on HackerOne.”
A month before that, Vars_Secc said they’d found a vulnerability in reddit.com.
“I poisoned Reddit’s cache,” they explained. “I’m going to exploit it further, then report it to reddit.”
KrebsOnSecurity sought comment from HackerOne, which said it would investigate the claims. This story will be updated if they respond.
The Vars_Secc telegram handle also has claimed ownership of the BreachForums member “Boxfan,” and Intel 471 shows Boxfan’s early posts on the forum had the Vars_Secc Telegram account in their signature. In their most recent post to BreachForums in January 2024, Boxfan disclosed a security vulnerability they found in Naver, the most popular search engine in South Korea (according to statista.com). Boxfan’s comments suggest they have strong negative feelings about South Korean culture.
“Have fun exploiting this vulnerability,” Boxfan wrote on BreachForums, after pasting a long string of computer code intended to demonstrate the flaw. “Fuck you South Korea and your discriminatory views. Nobody likes ur shit kpop you evil fucks. Whoever can dump this DB [database] congrats. I don’t feel like doing it so I’ll post it to the forum.”
The many identities tied to Kiberphant0m strongly suggest they are or until recently were a U.S. Army soldier stationed in South Korea. Kiberphant0m’s alter egos never mentioned their military rank, regiment, or specialization.
However, it is likely that Kiberphant0m’s facility with computers and networking was noticed by the Army, which undoubtedly would have placed them in some kind of role involving both.
According to the U.S. Army’s website, the bulk of its forces in South Korea reside within the Eighth Army, which has a dedicated cyber operations unit focused on defending against cyber threats.
On April 1, 2023, Vars_Secc posted to a public Telegram chat channel a screenshot of the National Security Agency’s website. The image indicated the visitor had just applied for some type of job at the NSA.
The NSA has not yet responded to requests for comment.
Reached via Telegram, Kiberphant0m acknowledged that KrebsOnSecurity managed to unearth their old handles.
“I see you found the IP behind it no way,” Kiberphant0m replied. “I see you managed to find my old aliases LOL.”
Kiberphant0m denied being in the U.S. Army or ever being in South Korea, and said all of that was a lengthy ruse designed to create a fictitious persona. “Epic opsec troll,” they claimed.
Asked if they were at all concerned about getting busted, Kiberphant0m called that an impossibility.
“I literally can’t get caught,” Kiberphant0m said, declining an invitation to explain why. “I don’t even live in the USA Mr. Krebs.”
Below is a mind map that hopefully helps illustrate some of the connections between and among Kiberphant0m’s apparent alter egos.
In this episode of This Week in Tech, the panel tackles the "biggest hack in US history," the future of AI, and the role of government in tech. From the Chinese hack's implications to Microsoft's AI-powered Recall, the Supreme Court's tech-related cases, and the push for social media age verification, Leo Laporte, Patrick Beja, Wesley Faulkner, and Alex Wilhelm provide insightful analysis and lively discussion on the most pressing issues facing the industry today.
Host: Leo Laporte
Guests: Patrick Beja, Wesley Faulkner, and Alex Wilhelm
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Federal prosecutors in Los Angeles this week unsealed criminal charges against five men alleged to be members of a hacking group responsible for dozens of cyber intrusions at major U.S. technology companies between 2021 and 2023, including LastPass, MailChimp, Okta, T-Mobile and Twilio.
The five men, aged 20 to 25, are allegedly members of a hacking conspiracy dubbed “Scattered Spider” and “Oktapus,” which specialized in SMS-based phishing attacks that tricked employees at tech firms into entering their credentials and one-time passcodes at phishing websites.
The targeted SMS scams asked employees to click a link and log in at a website that mimicked their employer’s Okta authentication page. Some SMS phishing messages told employees their VPN credentials were expiring and needed to be changed; other phishing messages advised employees about changes to their upcoming work schedule.
These attacks leveraged newly-registered domains that often included the name of the targeted company, such as twilio-help[.]com and ouryahoo-okta[.]com. The phishing websites were normally kept online for just one or two hours at a time, meaning they were often yanked offline before they could be flagged by anti-phishing and security services.
The phishing kits used for these campaigns featured a hidden Telegram instant message bot that forwarded any submitted credentials in real-time. The bot allowed the attackers to use the phished username, password and one-time code to log in as that employee at the real employer website.
In August 2022, multiple security firms gained access to the server that was receiving data from that Telegram bot, which on several occasions leaked the Telegram ID and handle of its developer, who used the nickname “Joeleoli.”
That Joeleoli moniker registered on the cybercrime forum OGusers in 2018 with the email address joelebruh@gmail.com, which also was used to register accounts at several websites for a Joel Evans from North Carolina. Indeed, prosecutors say Joeleoli’s real name is Joel Martin Evans, and he is a 25-year-old from Jacksonville, North Carolina.
One of Scattered Spider’s first big victims in its 2022 SMS phishing spree was Twilio, a company that provides services for making and receiving text messages and phone calls. The group then used their access to Twilio to attack at least 163 of its customers. According to prosecutors, the group mainly sought to steal cryptocurrency from victim companies and their employees.
“The defendants allegedly preyed on unsuspecting victims in this phishing scheme and used their personal information as a gateway to steal millions in their cryptocurrency accounts,” said Akil Davis, the assistant director in charge of the FBI’s Los Angeles field office.
Many of the hacking group’s phishing domains were registered through the registrar NameCheap, and FBI investigators said records obtained from NameCheap showed the person who managed those phishing websites did so from an Internet address in Scotland. The feds then obtained records from Virgin Media, which showed the address was leased for several months to Tyler Buchanan, a 22-year-old from Dundee, Scotland.
As first reported here in June, Buchanan was arrested in Spain as he tried to board a flight bound for Italy. The Spanish police told local media that Buchanan, who allegedly went by the alias “Tylerb,” at one time possessed Bitcoins worth $27 million.
The government says much of Tylerb’s cryptocurrency wealth was the result of successful SIM-swapping attacks, wherein crooks transfer the target’s phone number to a device they control and intercept any text messages or phone calls sent to the victim — including one-time passcodes for authentication, or password reset links sent via SMS.
According to several SIM-swapping channels on Telegram where Tylerb was known to frequent, rival SIM-swappers hired thugs to invade his home in February 2023. Those accounts state that the intruders assaulted Tylerb’s mother in the home invasion, and that they threatened to burn him with a blowtorch if he didn’t give up the keys to his cryptocurrency wallets. Tylerb was reputed to have fled the United Kingdom after that assault.
Prosecutors allege Tylerb worked closely on SIM-swapping attacks with Noah Michael Urban, another alleged Scattered Spider member from Palm Coast, Fla. who went by the handles “Sosa,” “Elijah,” and “Kingbob.”
Sosa was known to be a top member of the broader cybercriminal community online known as “The Com,” wherein hackers boast loudly about high-profile exploits and hacks that almost invariably begin with social engineering — tricking people over the phone, email or SMS into giving away credentials that allow remote access to corporate networks.
In January 2024, KrebsOnSecurity broke the news that Urban had been arrested in Florida in connection with multiple SIM-swapping attacks. That story noted that Sosa’s alter ego Kingbob routinely targeted people in the recording industry to steal and share “grails,” a slang term used to describe unreleased music recordings from popular artists.
FBI investigators identified a fourth alleged member of the conspiracy – Ahmed Hossam Eldin Elbadawy, 23, of College Station, Texas — after he used a portion of cryptocurrency funds stolen from a victim company to pay for an account used to register phishing domains.
The indictment unsealed Wednesday alleges Elbadawy controlled a number of cryptocurrency accounts used to receive stolen funds, along with another Texas man — Evans Onyeaka Osiebo, 20, of Dallas.
Members of Scattered Spider are reputed to have been involved in a September 2023 ransomware attack against the MGM Resorts hotel chain that quickly brought multiple MGM casinos to a standstill. In September 2024, KrebsOnSecurity reported that a 17-year-old from the United Kingdom was arrested last year by U.K. police as part of an FBI investigation into the MGM hack.
Evans, Elbadawy, Osiebo and Urban were all charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy, and one count of aggravated identity theft. Buchanan, who is named as an indicted co-conspirator, was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft.
A Justice Department press release states that if convicted, each defendant would face a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, up to five years in federal prison for the conspiracy count, and a mandatory two-year consecutive prison sentence for aggravated identity theft. Buchanan would face up to 20 years in prison for the wire fraud count as well.
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Show Notes - https://www.grc.com/sn/SN-1001-Notes.pdf
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The financial technology firm Finastra is investigating the alleged large-scale theft of information from its internal file transfer platform, KrebsOnSecurity has learned. Finastra, which provides software and services to 45 of the world’s top 50 banks, notified customers of the security incident after a cybercriminal began selling more than 400 gigabytes of data purportedly stolen from the company.
London-based Finastra has offices in 42 countries and reported $1.9 billion in revenues last year. The company employs more than 7,000 people and serves approximately 8,100 financial institutions around the world. A major part of Finastra’s day-to-day business involves processing huge volumes of digital files containing instructions for wire and bank transfers on behalf of its clients.
On November 8, 2024, Finastra notified financial institution customers that on Nov. 7 its security team detected suspicious activity on Finastra’s internally hosted file transfer platform. Finastra also told customers that someone had begun selling large volumes of files allegedly stolen from its systems.
“On November 8, a threat actor communicated on the dark web claiming to have data exfiltrated from this platform,” reads Finastra’s disclosure, a copy of which was shared by a source at one of the customer firms.
“There is no direct impact on customer operations, our customers’ systems, or Finastra’s ability to serve our customers currently,” the notice continued. “We have implemented an alternative secure file sharing platform to ensure continuity, and investigations are ongoing.”
But its notice to customers does indicate the intruder managed to extract or “exfiltrate” an unspecified volume of customer data.
“The threat actor did not deploy malware or tamper with any customer files within the environment,” the notice reads. “Furthermore, no files other than the exfiltrated files were viewed or accessed. We remain focused on determining the scope and nature of the data contained within the exfiltrated files.”
In a written statement in response to questions about the incident, Finastra said it has been “actively and transparently responding to our customers’ questions and keeping them informed about what we do and do not yet know about the data that was posted.” The company also shared an updated communication to its clients, which said while it was still investigating the root cause, “initial evidence points to credentials that were compromised.”
“Additionally, we have been sharing Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and our CISO has been speaking directly with our customers’ security teams to provide updates on the investigation and our eDiscovery process,” the statement continues. Here is the rest of what they shared:
“In terms of eDiscovery, we are analyzing the data to determine what specific customers were affected, while simultaneously assessing and communicating which of our products are not dependent on the specific version of the SFTP platform that was compromised. The impacted SFTP platform is not used by all customers and is not the default platform used by Finastra or its customers to exchange data files associated with a broad suite of our products, so we are working as quickly as possible to rule out affected customers. However, as you can imagine, this is a time-intensive process because we have many large customers that leverage different Finastra products in different parts of their business. We are prioritizing accuracy and transparency in our communications.
Importantly, for any customers who are deemed to be affected, we will be reaching out and working with them directly.”
On Nov. 8, a cybercriminal using the nickname “abyss0” posted on the English-language cybercrime community BreachForums that they’d stolen files belonging to some of Finastra’s largest banking clients. The data auction did not specify a starting or “buy it now” price, but said interested buyers should reach out to them on Telegram.
According to screenshots collected by the cyber intelligence platform Ke-la.com, abyss0 first attempted to sell the data allegedly stolen from Finastra on October 31, but that earlier sales thread did not name the victim company. However, it did reference many of the same banks called out as Finastra customers in the Nov. 8 post on BreachForums.
The October sales thread also included a starting price: $20,000. By Nov. 3, that price had been reduced to $10,000. A review of abyss0’s posts to BreachForums reveals this user has offered to sell databases stolen in several dozen other breaches advertised over the past six months.
The apparent timeline of this breach suggests abyss0 gained access to Finastra’s file sharing system at least a week before the company says it first detected suspicious activity, and that the Nov. 7 activity cited by Finastra may have been the intruder returning to exfiltrate more data.
Maybe abyss0 found a buyer who paid for their early retirement. We may never know, because this person has effectively vanished. The Telegram account that abyss0 listed in their sales thread appears to have been suspended or deleted. Likewise, abyss0’s account on BreachForums no longer exists, and all of their sales threads have since disappeared.
It seems improbable that both Telegram and BreachForums would have given this user the boot at the same time. The simplest explanation is that something spooked abyss0 enough for them to abandon a number of pending sales opportunities, in addition to a well-manicured cybercrime persona.
In March 2020, Finastra suffered a ransomware attack that sidelined a number of the company’s core businesses for days. According to reporting from Bloomberg, Finastra was able to recover from that incident without paying a ransom.
This is a developing story. Updates will be noted with timestamps. If you have any additional information about this incident, please reach out to krebsonsecurity @ gmail.com or at protonmail.com.
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In December 2023, KrebsOnSecurity revealed the real-life identity of Rescator, the nickname used by a Russian cybercriminal who sold more than 100 million payment cards stolen from Target and Home Depot between 2013 and 2014. Moscow resident Mikhail Shefel, who confirmed using the Rescator identity in a recent interview, also admitted reaching out because he is broke and seeking publicity for several new money making schemes.
Mr. Shefel, who recently changed his legal surname to Lenin, was the star of last year’s story, Ten Years Later, New Clues in the Target Breach. That investigation detailed how the 38-year-old Shefel adopted the nickname Rescator while working as vice president of payments at ChronoPay, a Russian financial company that paid spammers to advertise fake antivirus scams, male enhancement drugs and knockoff pharmaceuticals.
Mr. Shefel did not respond to requests for comment in advance of that December 2023 profile. Nor did he respond to reporting here in January 2024 that he ran an IT company with a 34-year-old Russian man named Aleksandr Ermakov, who was sanctioned by authorities in Australia, the U.K. and U.S. for stealing data on nearly 10 million customers of the Australian health insurance giant Medibank.
But not long after KrebsOnSecurity reported in April that Shefel/Rescator also was behind the theft of Social Security and tax information from a majority of South Carolina residents in 2012, Mr. Shefel began contacting this author with the pretense of setting the record straight on his alleged criminal hacking activities.
In a series of live video chats and text messages, Mr. Shefel confirmed he indeed went by the Rescator identity for several years, and that he did operate a slew of websites between 2013 and 2015 that sold payment card data stolen from Target, Home Depot and a number of other nationwide retail chains.
Shefel claims the true mastermind behind the Target and other retail breaches was Dmitri Golubov, an infamous Ukrainian hacker known as the co-founder of Carderplanet, among the earliest Russian-language cybercrime forums focused on payment card fraud. Mr. Golubov could not be reached for comment, and Shefel says he no longer has the laptop containing evidence to support that claim.
Shefel asserts he and his team were responsible for developing the card-stealing malware that Golubov’s hackers installed on Target and Home Depot payment terminals, and that at the time he was technical director of a long-running Russian cybercrime community called Lampeduza.
“My nickname was MikeMike, and I worked with Dmitri Golubov and made technologies for him,” Shefel said. “I’m also godfather of his second son.”
A week after breaking the story about the 2013 data breach at Target, KrebsOnSecurity published Who’s Selling Cards from Target?, which identified a Ukrainian man who went by the nickname Helkern as Rescator’s original identity. But Shefel claims Helkern was subordinate to Golubov, and that he was responsible for introducing the two men more than a decade ago.
“Helkern was my friend, I [set up a] meeting with Golubov and him in 2013,” Shefel said. “That was in Odessa, Ukraine. I was often in that city, and [it’s where] I met my second wife.”
Shefel claims he made several hundred thousand dollars selling cards stolen by Golubov’s Ukraine-based hacking crew, but that not long after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 Golubov cut him out of the business and replaced Shefel’s malware coding team with programmers in Ukraine.
Golubov was arrested in Ukraine in 2005 as part of a joint investigation with multiple U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, but his political connections in the country ensured his case went nowhere. Golubov later earned immunity from prosecution by becoming an elected politician and founding the Internet Party of Ukraine, which called for free internet for all, the creation of country-wide “hacker schools” and the “computerization of the entire economy.”
Mr. Shefel says he stopped selling stolen payment cards after being pushed out of the business, and invested his earnings in a now-defunct Russian search engine called tf[.]org. He also apparently ran a business called click2dad[.]net that paid people to click on ads for Russian government employment opportunities.
When those enterprises fizzled out, Shefel reverted to selling malware coding services for hire under the nickname “Getsend“; this claim checks out, as Getsend for many years advertised the same Telegram handle that Shefel used in our recent chats and video calls.
Shefel acknowledged that his outreach was motivated by a desire to publicize several new business ventures. None of those will be mentioned here because Shefel is already using my December 2023 profile of him to advertise what appears to be a pyramid scheme, and to remind others within the Russian hacker community of his skills and accomplishments.
Shefel says he is now flat broke, and that he currently has little to show for a storied hacking career. The Moscow native said he recently heard from his ex-wife, who had read last year’s story about him and was suddenly wondering where he’d hidden all of his earnings.
More urgently, Shefel needs money to stay out of prison. In February, he and Ermakov were arrested on charges of operating a short-lived ransomware affiliate program in 2021 called Sugar (a.k.a. Sugar Locker), which targeted single computers and end-users instead of corporations. Shefel is due to face those charges in a Moscow court on Friday, Nov. 15, 2024. Ermakov was recently found guilty and given two years probation.
Shefel claims his Sugar ransomware affiliate program was a bust, and never generated any profits. Russia is known for not prosecuting criminal hackers within its borders who scrupulously avoid attacking Russian businesses and consumers. When asked why he now faces prosecution over Sugar, Shefel said he’s certain the investigation was instigated by Pyotr “Peter” Vrublevsky — the son of his former boss at ChronoPay.
ChronoPay founder and CEO Pavel Vrublevsky was the key subject of my 2014 book Spam Nation, which described his role as head of one of Russia’s most notorious criminal spam operations.
Vrublevsky Sr. recently declared bankruptcy, and is currently in prison on fraud charges. Russian authorities allege Vrublevsky operated several fraudulent SMS-based payment schemes. They also accused Vrublevsky of facilitating money laundering for Hydra, the largest Russian darknet market at the time. Hydra trafficked in illegal drugs and financial services, including cryptocurrency tumbling for money laundering, exchange services between cryptocurrency and Russian rubles, and the sale of falsified documents and hacking services.
However, in 2022 KrebsOnSecurity reported on a more likely reason for Vrublevsky’s latest criminal charges: He’d been extensively documenting the nicknames, real names and criminal exploits of Russian hackers who worked with the protection of corrupt officials in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), and operating a Telegram channel that threatened to expose alleged nefarious dealings by Russian financial executives.
Shefel believes Vrublevsky’s son Peter paid corrupt cops to levy criminal charges against him after reporting the youth to Moscow police, allegedly for walking around in public with a loaded firearm. Shefel says the Russian authorities told the younger Vrublevsky that he had lodged the firearms complaint.
In July 2024, the Russian news outlet Izvestia published a lengthy investigation into Peter Vrublevsky, alleging that the younger son took up his father’s mantle and was responsible for advertising Sprut, a Russian-language narcotics bazaar that sprang to life after the Hydra darknet market was shut down by international law enforcement agencies in 2022.
Izvestia reports that Peter Vrublevsky is currently living in Switzerland, where he reportedly fled in 2022 after being “arrested in absentia” in Russia on charges of running a violent group that could be hired via Telegram to conduct a range of physical attacks in real life, including firebombings and muggings.
Shefel claims his former partner Golubov was involved in the development and dissemination of early ransomware strains, including Cryptolocker, and that Golubov remains active in the cybercrime community.
Meanwhile, Mr. Shefel portrays himself as someone who is barely scraping by with the few odd coding jobs that come his way each month. Incredibly, the day after our initial interview via Telegram, Shefel proposed going into business together.
By way of example, he suggested maybe a company centered around recovering lost passwords for cryptocurrency accounts, or perhaps a series of online retail stores that sold cheap Chinese goods at a steep markup in the United States.
“Hi, how are you?” he inquired. “Maybe we can open business?”
Show Notes - https://www.grc.com/sn/SN-1000-Notes.pdf
Hosts: Steve Gibson and Leo Laporte
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Microsoft today released updates to plug at least 89 security holes in its Windows operating systems and other software. November’s patch batch includes fixes for two zero-day vulnerabilities that are already being exploited by attackers, as well as two other flaws that were publicly disclosed prior to today.
The zero-day flaw tracked as CVE-2024-49039 is a bug in the Windows Task Scheduler that allows an attacker to increase their privileges on a Windows machine. Microsoft credits Google’s Threat Analysis Group with reporting the flaw.
The second bug fixed this month that is already seeing in-the-wild exploitation is CVE-2024-43451, a spoofing flaw that could reveal Net-NTLMv2 hashes, which are used for authentication in Windows environments.
Satnam Narang, senior staff research engineer at Tenable, says the danger with stolen NTLM hashes is that they enable so-called “pass-the-hash” attacks, which let an attacker masquerade as a legitimate user without ever having to log in or know the user’s password. Narang notes that CVE-2024-43451 is the third NTLM zero-day so far this year.
“Attackers continue to be adamant about discovering and exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities that can disclose NTLMv2 hashes, as they can be used to authenticate to systems and potentially move laterally within a network to access other systems,” Narang said.
The two other publicly disclosed weaknesses Microsoft patched this month are CVE-2024-49019, an elevation of privilege flaw in Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS); and CVE-2024-49040, a spoofing vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server.
Ben McCarthy, lead cybersecurity engineer at Immersive Labs, called special attention to CVE-2024-43602, a remote code execution vulnerability in Windows Kerberos, the authentication protocol that is heavily used in Windows domain networks.
“This is one of the most threatening CVEs from this patch release,” McCarthy said. “Windows domains are used in the majority of enterprise networks, and by taking advantage of a cryptographic protocol vulnerability, an attacker can perform privileged acts on a remote machine within the network, potentially giving them eventual access to the domain controller, which is the goal for many attackers when attacking a domain.”
McCarthy also pointed to CVE-2024-43498, a remote code execution flaw in .NET and Visual Studio that could be used to install malware. This bug has earned a CVSS severity rating of 9.8 (10 is the worst).
Finally, at least 29 of the updates released today tackle memory-related security issues involving SQL server, each of which earned a threat score of 8.8. Any one of these bugs could be used to install malware if an authenticated user connects to a malicious or hacked SQL database server.
For a more detailed breakdown of today’s patches from Microsoft, check out the SANS Internet Storm Center’s list. For administrators in charge of managing larger Windows environments, it pays to keep an eye on Askwoody.com, which frequently points out when specific Microsoft updates are creating problems for a number of users.
As always, if you experience any problems applying any of these updates, consider dropping a note about it in the comments; chances are excellent that someone else reading here has experienced the same issue, and maybe even has found a solution.
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is urging police departments and governments worldwide to beef up security around their email systems, citing a recent increase in cybercriminal services that use hacked police email accounts to send unauthorized subpoenas and customer data requests to U.S.-based technology companies.
In an alert (PDF) published this week, the FBI said it has seen un uptick in postings on criminal forums regarding the process of emergency data requests (EDRs) and the sale of email credentials stolen from police departments and government agencies.
“Cybercriminals are likely gaining access to compromised US and foreign government email addresses and using them to conduct fraudulent emergency data requests to US based companies, exposing the personal information of customers to further use for criminal purposes,” the FBI warned.
In the United States, when federal, state or local law enforcement agencies wish to obtain information about an account at a technology provider — such as the account’s email address, or what Internet addresses a specific cell phone account has used in the past — they must submit an official court-ordered warrant or subpoena.
Virtually all major technology companies serving large numbers of users online have departments that routinely review and process such requests, which are typically granted (eventually, and at least in part) as long as the proper documents are provided and the request appears to come from an email address connected to an actual police department domain name.
In some cases, a cybercriminal will offer to forge a court-approved subpoena and send that through a hacked police or government email account. But increasingly, thieves are relying on fake EDRs, which allow investigators to attest that people will be bodily harmed or killed unless a request for account data is granted expeditiously.
The trouble is, these EDRs largely bypass any official review and do not require the requester to supply any court-approved documents. Also, it is difficult for a company that receives one of these EDRs to immediately determine whether it is legitimate.
In this scenario, the receiving company finds itself caught between two unsavory outcomes: Failing to immediately comply with an EDR — and potentially having someone’s blood on their hands — or possibly leaking a customer record to the wrong person.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, compliance with such requests tends to be extremely high. For example, in its most recent transparency report (PDF) Verizon said it received more than 127,000 law enforcement demands for customer data in the second half of 2023 — including more than 36,000 EDRs — and that the company provided records in response to approximately 90 percent of requests.
One English-speaking cybercriminal who goes by the nicknames “Pwnstar” and “Pwnipotent” has been selling fake EDR services on both Russian-language and English cybercrime forums. Their prices range from $1,000 to $3,000 per successful request, and they claim to control “gov emails from over 25 countries,” including Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Hungary, India, Kenya, Jordan, Lebanon, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Vietnam.
“I cannot 100% guarantee every order will go through,” Pwnstar explained. “This is social engineering at the highest level and there will be failed attempts at times. Don’t be discouraged. You can use escrow and I give full refund back if EDR doesn’t go through and you don’t receive your information.”
A review of EDR vendors across many cybercrime forums shows that some fake EDR vendors sell the ability to send phony police requests to specific social media platforms, including forged court-approved documents. Others simply sell access to hacked government or police email accounts, and leave it up to the buyer to forge any needed documents.
“When you get account, it’s yours, your account, your liability,” reads an ad in October on BreachForums. “Unlimited Emergency Data Requests. Once Paid, the Logins are completely Yours. Reset as you please. You would need to Forge Documents to Successfully Emergency Data Request.”
Still other fake EDR service vendors claim to sell hacked or fraudulently created accounts on Kodex, a startup that aims to help tech companies do a better job screening out phony law enforcement data requests. Kodex is trying to tackle the problem of fake EDRs by working directly with the data providers to pool information about police or government officials submitting these requests, with an eye toward making it easier for everyone to spot an unauthorized EDR.
If police or government officials wish to request records regarding Coinbase customers, for example, they must first register an account on Kodexglobal.com. Kodex’s systems then assign that requestor a score or credit rating, wherein officials who have a long history of sending valid legal requests will have a higher rating than someone sending an EDR for the first time.
It is not uncommon to see fake EDR vendors claim the ability to send data requests through Kodex, with some even sharing redacted screenshots of police accounts at Kodex.
Matt Donahue is the former FBI agent who founded Kodex in 2021. Donahue said just because someone can use a legitimate police department or government email to create a Kodex account doesn’t mean that user will be able to send anything. Donahue said even if one customer gets a fake request, Kodex is able to prevent the same thing from happening to another.
Kodex told KrebsOnSecurity that over the past 12 months it has processed a total of 1,597 EDRs, and that 485 of those requests (~30 percent) failed a second-level verification. Kodex reports it has suspended nearly 4,000 law enforcement users in the past year, including:
-1,521 from the Asia-Pacific region;
-1,290 requests from Europe, the Middle East and Asia;
-460 from police departments and agencies in the United States;
-385 from entities in Latin America, and;
-285 from Brazil.
Donahue said 60 technology companies are now routing all law enforcement data requests through Kodex, including an increasing number of financial institutions and cryptocurrency platforms. He said one concern shared by recent prospective customers is that crooks are seeking to use phony law enforcement requests to freeze and in some cases seize funds in specific accounts.
“What’s being conflated [with EDRs] is anything that doesn’t involve a formal judge’s signature or legal process,” Donahue said. “That can include control over data, like an account freeze or preservation request.”
In a hypothetical example, a scammer uses a hacked government email account to request that a service provider place a hold on a specific bank or crypto account that is allegedly subject to a garnishment order, or party to crime that is globally sanctioned, such as terrorist financing or child exploitation.
A few days or weeks later, the same impersonator returns with a request to seize funds in the account, or to divert the funds to a custodial wallet supposedly controlled by government investigators.
“In terms of overall social engineering attacks, the more you have a relationship with someone the more they’re going to trust you,” Donahue said. “If you send them a freeze order, that’s a way to establish trust, because [the first time] they’re not asking for information. They’re just saying, ‘Hey can you do me a favor?’ And that makes the [recipient] feel valued.”
Echoing the FBI’s warning, Donahue said far too many police departments in the United States and other countries have poor account security hygiene, and often do not enforce basic account security precautions — such as requiring phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.
How are cybercriminals typically gaining access to police and government email accounts? Donahue said it’s still mostly email-based phishing, and credentials that are stolen by opportunistic malware infections and sold on the dark web. But as bad as things are internationally, he said, many law enforcement entities in the United States still have much room for improvement in account security.
“Unfortunately, a lot of this is phishing or malware campaigns,” Donahue said. “A lot of global police agencies don’t have stringent cybersecurity hygiene, but even U.S. dot-gov emails get hacked. Over the last nine months, I’ve reached out to CISA (the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) over a dozen times about .gov email addresses that were compromised and that CISA was unaware of.”